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LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN INDIA: 
A CALL FOR SYSTEMIC AND EMPIRICAL 
APPROACHES
 Sudhir Krishnaswamy,*Sindhu K Sivakumar** & Shishir Bail***
Judicial delays and high pendency is a serious problem that has 
rule of law and fundamental rights implications. Law and judicial 
reform in India aimed at reducing judicial delays and pendency 
have met with limited success since they have been almost solely 
focused on increasing the number of courts and such other supply-
driven mechanisms without ascertaining the causes of delay. This 
paper argues for re-orienting law and judicial reform by engaging 
in empirical methods. In so arguing, this paper also  exposes the 
difficulties in using empirical methods in India owing to the 
unavailability of crucial data. It also suggests some non-
conventional solutions for more effective and efficient civil and 
criminal justice systems. 
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It is argued by many that the General Election 2014 was a vote for 
1development.  The election campaign witnessed heated rhetorical debates 
*Professor of Law, Azim Premji University; and Visiting Dr. Ambedkar Chair Professor in 
Indian Constitutional Law, Columbia University.
** Graduate Fellow, Azim Premji University; Non-Practising Advocate, India; and Non-
Practising  Solicitor (England & Wales). 
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1 Prakash Kaswan, India's Elections and the Politics of Development, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (May 20, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/05/20/indias-elections-and-the-politics-of-development/; Frank Jack Daniel 
& Rajesh Kumar Singh, The great Indian election: it's about jobs, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2014), 
h t tp: / / in . reuters .com/ar t ic le /2014/03/27/ india-elect ion-2014-youth- jobs-
idINDEEA2Q0HT20140327.
2about the appropriate model of economic development for India.  Despite 
the deeply divisive tenor of these debates, there was, and continues to be, a 
surprising alignment between the major parties on the place of legal and 
judicial reform as a critical ingredient of the development process. The 
2014 Bharatiya Janata Party manifesto had a few overarching objectives in 
this regard: one, increasing access to justice; two, reducing delays and 
pendencies at the formal courts; and three, making the law more accessible 
to the common man. It proposes to achieve this objective through a 
predictable list of strategies: increase the number of judges; create more 
courts, including special courts for intellectual property and commercial 
matters, and fast track courts; encourage ADR, particularly arbitration, Lok 
Adalats and tribunals; and in relation to making the law more accessible, do 
away with old, unnecessary laws, simplify existing procedures and 
3language, and increase legal awareness.  By contrast, the Congress 
Manifesto confined itself to broad and general principles: the 'protection of 
human rights', increasing diversity in judicial appointments, improving 
4judicial accountability, increasing Gram Nyayalayas and legal aid.
For those familiar with the thinking and policy debates on legal and 
judicial system reform, what is striking is how unchanging and 
unimaginative the strategies proposed to 'reform' the system are. Indian 
policy makers have over the years increased the supply of judges, diverted 
and dispersed cases to Alternative Dispute Resolution forums, special 
courts and tribunals with little or no improvement of the overall health of the 
legal system. Despite the litany of failures, our political and bureaucratic 
2 Journal of National Law University, Delhi [Vol. 2
2 V.Sambandan & Bhagwati, Sen and India's fight against poverty, THE HINDU CENTRE FOR 
PUBLIC  POLICY  (Aug.  19,  2013),  ht tp: / /www.thehinducentre.com/the-
arena/article5038021.ece; Lalita Panicker, Two States: Kerala, Gujarat and their 
development, HINDUSTAN TIMES, (Apr. 21, 2014), available at http:// 
www.hindustantimes.com/elections2014/opinion/while-gujarat-is-investor-friendly-
kerala-triumphs-in-social-indices/article1-1210341.aspx. 
3 In substance, the BJP's proposals on legal system reform for 2014 are mostly identical to 
what it proposed in 2009. See Bharatiya Janata Party, Lok Sabha Election 2009 Manifesto, 
available at http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf/election_manifesto_english.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2014). The only major additions we see in 2014 are one, the focus on making India 
into a global arbitration and legal process outsourcing hub, and two, the objectives related 
making legal information more accessible, including the popular promise to “undertake a 
comprehensive review of the legal system to simplify complex legislations – converge 
overlapping legislation, as well as remove contradictory and redundant laws.” 
4 Indian National Congress, Lok Sabha Election Manifesto 2014, 45-46, available at 
http://inc.in/images/Pages/English%20Manifesto%20for%20Web.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 
2014).
discourse is unable to move beyond these 'tried and failed' strategies that are 
unsystematic or fragmented, unempirical and without a nuanced normative 
foundation. Moreover, there is no effort to develop any critical insight into 
the causes of failure. In this essay, we show why the current approach must 
be replaced with an empirically grounded, theoretically nuanced and 
systemic approach to legal and judicial system reform and demonstrate 
innovative solutions based on such an approach.
I. THE CURRENT APPROACH
Most current proposals for legal reform in India lack a systemic 
perspective. Isolated, disparate and potentially contradictory initiatives 
founded on inarticulate motivations and principles are assumed to add up to 
a program of  reform for the legal system. For example, the proposal for 
"…doubling the number of courts and judges in the subordinate 
5 judiciary…." may potentially reduce backlogs in the lower courts. 
However, there is no evidence that previous increases in judicial strength by 
themselves have indeed reduced backlog. Further, as the disposal of cases in 
the lower courts is intricately tied to the ease with which interlocutory 
orders may be reviewed and appealed in the High Court and Supreme Court, 
an expedient lower court may not improve the overall throughput of the 
system.
In 2002, the Bharatiya Janata Party led National Democratic Alliance 
central government made a number of amendments to the Civil Procedure 
Code, 1908 with a view to reducing delays in civil litigation. In particular 
they focused on the procedural rules set out in the Code that gave discretion 
to the court to condone delays and other excesses of the parties in 
conducting litigation. The court's discretion to grant extensions beyond 90 
days for the filing of the statement of defence was removed (Order 8, Rule 
1); the court's discretion to allow the late production of evidence was also 
removed (deletion of Order 18, Rule 17A); and in relation to adjournments, 
it was mandated that no more than three adjournments were to be granted to 
a party over the course of an individual suit (Order 17, Rule 1(1), Proviso), 
and that the court awards costs occasioned by the adjournment or such 
higher cost as the court may deem fit (Order 17, Rule 1(2)). In relation to 
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5Bharatiya Janata Party, Election Manifesto 2014, 12, http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/ 
full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf (last visited Jul. 30, 2014).
adjournments, the amendment left intact the Proviso at Rule 1(2) which 
prescribed the conditions under which a court could grant adjournments; 
this proviso provides for day-to-day hearing and also considerably limits 
6the latitude granted to courts for this purpose.
These amendments were extremely unpopular with the Bar and 
7provoked public protests  and legal challenges. One of these legal 
challenges to the constitutional validity of these amendments came before 
8the Supreme Court in Salem Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India  
which upheld the validity of these amendments. However, in a follow-up 
9decision in Salem Advocates Bar Association (II) v. Union of India,  the 
Supreme Court read down virtually all of these amendments: the proviso of 
Order 8, Rule 1 providing for the upper limit of 90 days to file written 
statement is now only directory, not mandatory, and courts are allowed to 
grant extensions beyond this time-limit; the deletion of Order 18, Rule 17A 
was made redundant as the power of the court to allow late evidence pre-
dated Rule 17A; and with respect to adjournments, the 3-adjournment per 
hearing rule did not extend to circumstances where one of the conditions 
10specified in the Proviso to Rule 1(2) were met.
What can we learn from this legislative amendment and judicial 
rollback? It appears that the motivations of the legislators were not aligned 
with those of the various participants of the litigation system (i.e., parties, 
counsel and judges). We need to understand the incentives at play that might 
be behind the courts' reluctance to actively manage cases and hold lawyers 
to account. Significantly, even though the Code gave the courts the power to 
use costs sanctions (even before 2002), it is well known that courts hardly 
4 Journal of National Law University, Delhi [Vol. 2
6 For an extensive overview of the problems with and attempts to reform civil litigation in 
India, see Hiram E. Chodosh et al., Indian Civil Justice Reform: Limitation and Preservation 
of the Adversarial Process, 30 N.Y.U J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1997-1998).
7 J. Venkatesan, SC Judge to head panel on CPC amendments, THE HINDU, (Oct. 26, 2002),  
available at http://hindu.com/2002/10/26/stories/2002102603161300.htm; Janardan Singh, 
Mixed Response to CPC amendments, THE TIMES OF INDIA, (Jul. 22, 2002),  available at 
http:/ / t imesofindia. indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/Mixed-response-to-CPC-
amendments/articleshow/16706122.cms.
8 Salem Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 189.
9 Salem Advocates Bar Association (II) v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3353.
10 It is a rather counter-intuitive interpretation of the Supreme Court that the Proviso was a 
limitation or exception to the three-adjournment rule in Rule 1(1); rather, the better 
interpretation would have been to say that the 2002 amendment left the Proviso intact in 
order to guide the court as to when it should exercise its discretion to grant any one of the 
three allowed adjournments to a party.  
ever used this measure to urge litigants and lawyers to stick to a reasonable 
schedule. Moog explains that the courts' reluctance is due to the frequency 
of transfer of the judges, particularly in the subordinate judiciary, which 
means that a trial does not stay with a single judge over the course of its 
lifetime. Judges therefore do not have enough time in a court-room to plan 
and manage dockets, and the frequent transfer often makes judges 
'outsiders' in a given court, making them practically unable to exercise 
11sanction over the more entrenched lawyer community.
Further, we need to understand the incentive structures within which 
litigating lawyers and clients operate and what they gain by seeking so 
many adjournments. Here again, Moog highlights how the litigation 
profession in India is quite starkly unequal in terms of work-loads – a small 
minority of lawyers attract large volumes of work, and these lawyers cannot 
manage their work-loads without being able to get adjournments when 
needed; further, the practice in the legal profession of charging 'per hearing' 
or 'per filing' incentivises them to file many (arguably) unnecessary 
applications and seek hearings on minor, frivolous points – essentially, the 
more applications and hearings there are in a single case, the more their 
financial rewards. 
The point here is simple: symptomatic, piecemeal reforms will not 
work unless we pay attention to the incentives and motivations of all 
participants in the litigation system. An accurate sociology of the legal 
system is essential to inform and shape legal reform that corrects incentives 
and aligns motivations. For root and branch systemic reform, we need an 
empirically rigorous knowledge platform that allows for analytically sharp 
and theoretically nuanced reform measures to be designed. 
Our second issue with the existing strategies for legal system reform in 
India is that they are advanced on little or no empirical evidence relating to 
institutions, their performances and the disposal of cases. Where any 
evidence is offered, it is far from rigorous, such as the evidence set out in the 
12Annual Reports of the High Courts and Supreme Court,  or evidence that is 
personal and anecdotal in character. Unlike other areas of economic and 
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11 Moog & Robert, Delays in the Indian Courts: Why the Judges Don't Take Control,16 JUST. 
SYS J. 19 (1992-1994).
12 The foremost sources of data on the performance of the judiciary are the reports provided 
government policy, the legal and judicial system is still nested in an 
empirical black hole. As administrative control over the courts is divided 
13between the executive and the judiciary,  there is no coherent centralised 
approach to data collection and dissemination. There is widespread 
variation in the quality and quantity of accessible court data across the 
different states in India, especially at the district level. Basic measures of 
court performance and of the state of litigation, such as institution rates, 
disposal rates, and pendency rates, are not easily available for several 
districts in India, leading one to wonder how policy makers even define the 
scope of the delay and pendency problems, let alone find ways to tackle 
14them.
Recent academic work has partially compensated for this 
administrative failure, through rigorous analysis of limited data sets. For 
15example, Hazra and Micevska have  measured congestion rates for lower 
courts in India in the period 1995-99, and Nick Robinson's study of the 
Supreme Court suggests that there are major state-level variations in their 
16 contribution to the Supreme Court's case-load. Nevertheless, both the 
major political parties, bureaucrats and senior judges continue to advocate 
6 Journal of National Law University, Delhi [Vol. 2
by the Supreme Court through the Court News publication. The data contained in this 
publication is no doubt useful but suffers from a few major problems. Firstly, it is released 
erratically; there has not been a single edition of this publication in the year 2014 till date. 
Second, the data is not presented in sufficient detail; we only receive a breakup of the 
institution, disposal and pendency of civil and criminal cases, without further details on what 
kinds of cases these are. This is more of a problem in the case of civil litigation, as the 
National Crime Records Bureau does a fair job of releasing data on the various stages of the 
criminal process. For a sample Court News publication, see Court News, SUPREME COURT 
OF INDIA (Oct.-Dec. 2013), available at http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/ 
courtnews/2013_issue_4.pdf.
13 This division of administrative and financial control has long been a source of tension 
between the two branches of government. See Moog &Robert, Elite-Court Relations in 
India: An Unsatisfactory Arrangement, 38 ASIAN SURVEY 410 (1998).
14 E.g., while Karnataka's e-courts website (http://ecourts.gov.in/karnataka) allows users to 
access the "case status" of an individual case pending or disposed in any district court in 
Karnataka, it does not contain any useful aggregate information on institution, disposal or 
pendency rates by district that can be used by academics and policy analysts in 
understanding the litigation trends and judicial performance in these districts.  The other 
available website, causelist.kar.nic.in/districtportal/dashboard.asp, does contain 
institutional performance data, but on a "per day" basis, leaving the user to make more 
meaningful monthly or yearly aggregations on their own.  This is also available for a limited 
period of time, from late August 2009, to the third week of January 2014.
15 Arnab Kumar Hazra & Maja B. Micevska, The Problem of Court Congestion: Evidence 
from Indian Lower Courts, in JUDICIAL REFORMS IN INDIA: ISSUES AND ASPECTS (Arnab 
Hazra & Bibek Debroy, ed. 2007).
16 Nick Robinson, A Quantitative Analysis of the Indian Supreme Court's Workload, 10 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 570 (Sept. 2013).
'all India' reforms instead of 'localised' reform initiatives. No serious legal 
and judicial system reform is likely unless we take the facts seriously and 
engage in statistically sophisticated empirical analyses. 
Apart from the need for a systemic perspective and empirical 
knowledge, advocates for legal and judicial system reform must tackle the 
normative argument for a strong, functional legal system. In India, there are 
certain common arguments that persist in public policy and intellectual 
discourse that push against a full-fledged effort to reform the Indian legal 
system. First, it is sometimes suggested that the central problem of the legal 
system in India is a cultural one; that the colonial origins of our legal system 
run against the grain of our cultural traditions and hence it is beyond reform 
17 and must be replaced. The argument is misleading insofar as it suggests 
that there existed a functional legal 'system' before colonial times (historical 
18 evidence does not fully support this). Further, the global academic 
literature on the relationship between the origin of a legal system and 
development suggests that one of India's biggest competitive advantage is 
19 its adoption of a common law legal system. Perhaps it is relevant that our 
historical efforts to revitalize and revive so-called traditional and 
20 indigenous dispute resolution systems have met with little success, and 
21deliver a questionable quality of justice.  In this paper we do not review the 
argument of colonial origin comprehensively as both national parties 
embrace a modern economy at the centre of the development project and a 
modern legal system is essential to shape and regulate this economy.  
72014] Legal and Judicial Reform in India
17 For an early analysis of this manner of criticism, see Marc Galanter, The Displacement of 
Traditional Law in Modern India, 24 J. SOC. ISSUES 65 (1968). The debate between the 
'traditional' ostensibly consensual modes of dispute resolution and the adversarial formal 
legal system is still very much a live one. See Kalindi Kokal, Hope for Justice: Importance of 
Informal Systems, 68 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 22 (2013).
18 For a nuanced account of the state of social regulation in India before the arrival of the 
British and the introduction of the Indian Legal System, see Graham Smith & Duncan 
Derrett, Hindu Judicial Administration in Pre-British Times and its Lesson for Today, 95 J. 
AM. ORIENTAL SOC. 417 (1975); Duncan Derrett, Law and the Social Order in India Before 
the Muhamaddan Conquests, 7 J. ECON.  &  SOC. HIST. ORIENT 73 (1964).
19 See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46  J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 285-332 (2008).
20 See Catherine Meschievitz & Marc Galanter, In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The Politics 
of a Moribund Institution, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: VOL 2 COMPARATIVE 
STUDIES 47-77 (Richard  Abel ed.,1982).
21 Lok Adalats are another iteration of an ostensibly traditional mode of dispute resolution. 
See Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Bread for the Poor: Access to Justice and the Rights 
of  the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 789 (2003).
The second normative argument against legal system reform is that a 
more efficient legal system will merely enhance the oppressive power of the 
State – that where there is an unjust state with unfair laws, enhancing legal 
system capabilities will oppress more than it liberates. While there is a grain 
of truth to this argument, it is manifestly the case in India that a just state 
with fair laws but an inefficient legal system also oppresses its citizens.  
Further, legal system reform can itself act as a check against the continuance 
of an unfair state and unfair laws – as Dworkin argues, a legal system can 
22 'work itself pure'. We must note that legal system reform is not just about 
increasing state capacity (through recruitment of judges, police, 
prosecution staff, and the design of improved processes) to secure greater 
peace and social order; a normatively nuanced approach to legal system 
reform is also about reinvigorating institutions and making them 
accountable to the ordinary citizens of the country, thereby limiting state 
power by holding our officials to constitutional standards of probity and 
23conduct.  Hence, legal and judicial system reform must create a modern 
legal system that enhances the capacity of citizens to hold the State to 
account.
So far in this section we have argued that a systemic, empirical and 
normatively nuanced approach to legal and judicial system reform is 
necessary to make a significant impact on development outcomes in India 
and improve our collective well-being. In the rest of this essay, we 
demonstrate how such an approach can inform and guide legal reform 
strategies in three areas: civil litigation; access to legal system information 
and the criminal process. 
II. CIVIL LITIGATION REFORM: ALIGNING INCENTIVES
India has grappled with the problem of delays and arrears in its courts 
for a long time. This is particularly true of the civil side; a Civil Justice 
Committee (under Justice Rankin) was appointed as early as 1924-25 to 
tackle the problem of delays and arrears in civil litigation. The Rankin 
8 Journal of National Law University, Delhi [Vol. 2
22 Ronald Dworkin, LAW'S EMPIRE 407 (1986). 
23 For a more detailed argument see S Krishnaswamy, Introduction, in INDIAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM REFORM: EMPIRICAL BASELINES AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS (Sudhir 
Krishnaswamy  ed., forthcoming  2015).
Committee, and every committee and Law Commission subsequently, has 
focused almost exclusively on increasing the supply of dispute resolution 
services. This is sought to be done by enhancing institutional capacity – 
augmenting and improving physical infrastructure with new courts, scaling 
up judicial strength, reducing judicial vacancies, and preventing the 
diversion of serving judges to other duties. If the new government draws 
exclusively from the menu set out in the manifesto, it too will persist with 
this model of reform. In this section of the essay, we argue that a new model 
of reform is the need of the hour – one that focuses on incentives of various 
actors in the civil justice system that promotes the optimal use of dispute 
resolution services.
Before we turn to what we mean by optimal use of dispute resolution 
services, we should acknowledge that the focus on supply (i.e., increasing 
institutional capacity) has yielded some results. The Supreme Court's Court 
News publication, which contains quarterly rates of institution, disposal and 
pendency of cases at the Supreme Court, High Courts and subordinate 
courts, shows that current disposal rates are more or less able to keep up 
25with corresponding institution rates.  However, the supply-side approach 
has not been able to contend with the huge volume of "arrears" or 
"backlogs" of cases that have been pending before the courts for more than a 
year. The "percentage decrease in pendency", which is a key indicator of 
26whether arrears are being tackled, is consistently low or negative.  To 
tackle the large volume of these arrears, what we need is systemic reform 
that addresses the skewed incentives driving unsustainably high pendency 
rates in our civil courts. 
Every civil litigation system contains certain built-in incentive 
structures that impact litigation behaviour (litigant, lawyer and judge 
24  
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24 th E.g., Justice S.R. Das' High Courts Arrears Committee (1949); 14  Law Commission 
thReport (1956), Vol. 1; High Court Arrears Committee Report (1972); 77  Law Commission 
thReport (1978); 79  Law Commission Report (1979).
25 For example, in the last quarter of 2013, the Supreme Court saw 17,036 fresh institutions 
and 17,920 disposals, the High Courts (in aggregate) saw 560889 institutions and 498202 
disposals, and the lower courts 4736967 institutions and 4419310 disposals. See Court 
News, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (Oct. - Dec. 2013), available at http:// 
supremecourtofindia.nic.in/courtnews/2013_issue_4.pdf.
26 E.g., Court News, supra note 25. In the last quarter of 2013, the subordinate courts saw 
27566425 pending cases and had a 1.17% increase in pendency from the previous quarter. 
Similarly, the High Courts had 4589920 cases pending and a 1.34% increase in pendency.
behaviour) in that jurisdiction. Litigation behaviour ultimately has a major 
impact on the pendency rates in that jurisdiction. For example, settlement 
rates can have a huge impact on overall pendency rates in civil disputes. In 
the other Commonwealth jurisdictions (that, like India, are based on an 
adversarial common law system), it is not uncommon for over 70% of civil 
cases (and sometimes going up to 90% or more) to settle before going to 
27trial.  In India, on the other hand, settlement rates in civil disputes are 
28shockingly low. One survey pegs the rate at around 5%.  What this means 
is that almost all the civil cases that enter the court system in India remain in 
the court system all the way until the very end, that is, until trial and 
judgment. It is no wonder that congestion rates in India are far higher than in 
more developed Commonwealth countries. Thus, a central challenge for 
civil justice reform in India is to design institutions and processes that 
incentivise settlement over the course of a case. 
To incentivise settlement of cases on or before the first date of trial or at 
a later stage, we need to address the practice of civil litigation and create 
institutions that support a culture of settlement. One reason for the low or 
late settlement rates in India is that, unlike in the UK and other 
29 Commonwealth jurisdictions, the practice of having a "continuous trial" is 
30virtually non-existent.  "Continuous trial" refers to the practice that once a 
civil trial begins, it should proceed without interruption until its conclusion. 
In India, while the Civil Procedure Code 1908, does envisage that trials 
31should proceed continuously once started,  in practice, trials typically tend 
to take place in a fragmented fashion, involving 4-5 fragmented stages, and 
with as many as 20-40 adjournments granted over the lifetime of a single 
32trial.
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As Barry Walsh argues, the lack of a continuous civil trial process in 
India means that there is no certainty for the parties about the timing of the 
33outcome (i.e., the judgment).  When parties cannot predict with reasonable 
certainty when a particular trial will be completed and the judgment or order 
given, there is no pressure on them to ever settle their dispute. Typically, in 
any civil dispute, one party will tend to have a stronger case on merits. This 
party already has no incentive to settle the case for any sum lesser than what 
he or she is likely to achieve through a judgment. However, the other side, 
which is the party with the weaker case, does have the incentive to push for 
settlement to mitigate the extent of his losses.  Studies on litigant behaviour 
in relation to settlement have shown that litigants with a weaker case are 
most likely to feel the pressure to settle when they start to believe that the 
34  time of loss is not far off. In the Indian context, unfortunately, since parties 
cannot predict when a trial is likely to conclude or how long it will take, they 
may never reach that frame of mind.  Obviously, this does not impact cases 
where both sides believe that they have strong claims on merit; however, 
"outcome date certainty" can encourage settlement in the significant 
number of civil cases pending before the courts today that are not so finely 
balanced on merits. Reform promoting the continuous trial, and therefore, 
35“outcome date certainty”  can thus positively influence the settlement and 
therefore reduce a number of cases pending before the courts. 
Apart from incentivising settlement, it is also necessary that our court 
system denies advantages to litigants who procrastinate in reaching 
settlements and engage in other dilatory behaviours over the course of 
litigation. Cost sanctions are the most effective tool of the court in this 
regard. In England, for example, severe cost sanctions are imposed on 
parties who unreasonably reject settlement offers from the other side and 
36 then go on to lose the case; cost sanctions may also be imposed on parties 
who behave unreasonably over the course of a case, whether they win or 
lose, and "unreasonable" behaviour could include anything from seeking 
unnecessary adjournments to unreasonably refusing to mediate where the 
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court suggests mediation.  In India, while the CPC does give the courts the 
38 power to use costs sanctions in cases of adjournments, it is well known that 
courts hardly ever use this measure to force litigants and lawyers to behave. 
Unless there is a concerted effort to inform and train the bar and the bench to 
adapt to these new protocols of practice, there is likely to be stubborn 
resistance to these changes.
Even with outcome date certainty and cost sanctions, it is unlikely that a 
settlement culture will develop in India without the support of institutions 
39that promote settlement. The presence of strong ADR structures,  such as a 
strong court-annexed mediation program may encourage litigants to settle 
their disputes at the early stages of litigation. Mediation-based settlements 
may be especially appealing to those litigants who wish to preserve their 
relationships after the dispute, such as in family disputes, or where the case 
is evenly balanced and neither party is likely to win more in litigation than in 
settlement. When such disputes are taken out of the court system early, there 
will be a corresponding decrease in the number of cases pending before the 
40 courts. Our research shows that the mediation process can settle up to 45-
55% of the disputes referred within a period of 6 months at negligible costs 
to the parties and to the exchequer. In India, while court-annexed mediation 
is increasingly used, particularly in the urban centres, it is not widespread 
enough to have a significant impact on overall early settlement rates.
Similarly, a strong, functional arbitration system (with high quality 
arbitrators and arbitral institutions) can do much in keeping complex, 
commercial disputes out of the court system. In India however, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that ad hoc non-institutionalized arbitration 
has failed to reduce the burden on the courts. In fact, evidence suggests that 
arbitrations in India regularly break down and seek court assistance or 
interference at nearly every stage of the arbitration process. The almost 
37
12 Journal of National Law University, Delhi [Vol. 2
37 See Halsey v. Milton Keynes NHS Trust, [2004] E.W.C.A. Civ. 576 (where the Court of 
Appeal said that a winning party (at trial) could be deprived of some or all of its costs on the 
grounds of any unreasonable refusal to mediate).
38 Order 17, Rule 1(2), CPC.
39 See Inessa Love, Settling out of court: How Effective Is Alternative Dispute Resolution? 4 
(2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282044-
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routine manner in which arbitrator appointments (S.11, Arbitration & 
Conciliation Act, 1996) and arbitral awards (S.34, Arbitration & 
Conciliation Act, 1996) are challenged before the courts only serves to 
exacerbate the delays and backlogs at the already overburdened District and 
High Courts. Hence, what we need is a strong 'institutional' arbitration 
culturewhere we have institutions that can regulate the conduct of 
arbitration  and  disentangle  arbitration  and  the  courts.
The discussion in this section highlights only some of the many skewed 
incentives plaguing the civil litigation system in India. We need to correct 
the various inter-connected rules and infrastructures that constitute these 
perverse incentives in a holistic, systemic program of reform of the 
litigation system.We must be willing to experiment with each of these 
reform measures, iteratively review evidence and engage in a process of 
continuous reform and improvement based on periodic, reliable, well 
organized and granular evidence.
III. ACCESS TO LEGAL SYSTEM INFORMATION
Despite some progress with computerisation and online access to court 
data in recent years, one of the major problems an academic or policy 
analyst faces is the lack of access to reliable data in usable formats that may 
be put to analysis. While this is true generally of legal system data, the 
problem aggravates as we move down from the apex Supreme Court to the 
Magistrate or District Courts. Access to such data is essential to evaluate 
reform strategies and review resource allocation through rigorous empirical 
research on congestion or judicial productivity rates.
Currently,'national-level' or 'all-India' solutions are proposed devoid of 
empirical foundations. One recent example in the BJP Manifesto is the 
proposal to double the strength of the courts and judges in the subordinate 
judiciary across India. The problem with such national-level solutions is 
that the data reveals that High Courts and District Courts across the different 
Indian states face widely varying rates of institution and pendency (on the 
41 civil and criminal side) and have widely varying rates of disposal. What 
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this means is that omnibus national solutions, like doubling the number of 
judges in all states, will have uneven effects on delay and pendency and 
court congestion across the different states. Accurate publicly available 
data will allow institutional reform proposals to be localised, built on 
accurate analysis of the nature and causes of delay and therefore will be 
42more likely to yield results.
The biggest challenge to developing such localised solutions lies in the 
unavailability of local-level data. For example, while the Court News data 
tells us that there are state-level differences in institution, disposal and 
pendency rates in the High Courts and subordinate courts, we do not know if 
there are any district-level differences within a particular state. The e-courts 
database, which is maintained by the High Courts (with the help of the 
District Courts) and Supreme Court, in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology's Department of Electronics 
& Information Technology, does contain information about cases handled 
by the district courts across India; however, the form in which the data is 
presented at the front-end (that is, in the website), does not render it useful in 
academic or policy related research.The motivation for the current Supreme 
Court, High Court and e-courts websites is to provide information to 
litigants and lawyers about the status of individual cases. It allows them to 
access the day's causelist as well as orders relating to a particular case. This 
case-level data cannot be aggregated to carry out institutional analysis of 
filing rates, disposal rates, or other indicators of court congestion and 
judicial productivity. Hence, we suggest that in addition to what is presently 
available on the e-court website, the government publish periodic 
(preferably monthly) reports on the courts in a format that allows for the 
assessment of both judicial productivity and congestion rates. This 
information will ground empirically driven, locally specific reform 
initiatives that will yield better results. 
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Apart from the lack of reliable local-level data on the performance and 
efficiency of the courts, there are larger information deficits that result in 
significant 'rule of law' costs and threaten the common law character of 
India's legal system. The irregular reporting and the unavailability of court 
decisions have resulted in the gradual erosion in the controlling power of 
43precedent. A recent study of the Supreme Court  found that the number of 
regular hearing matters disposed by the Court in a year is higher than the 
number of reported judgments on the court websites as well as Indian law 
databases such as Judis or Indian Kanoon in that year. The data gap is 
significant even if we take into account the practise of clubbing together 
similar cases or issuing a single opinionfor multiple cases. If there are final 
judgments of the Supreme Court that effectively create no precedent, this 
44results in significant 'rule of law' costs.  The principle of precedent 
preserves the rule of law as like cases should be decided alike, or 
consistently with each other. One of the major causes of the unsustainable 
number of appeals and review petitions in the higher courts is the 
breakdown of precedent rules. If litigants and lawyers do not know what the 
law of the land is, they will be likely to institute fresh appeals involving 
points of law that have already been decided by the higher courts. Further, 
since unpublished decisions also lead to inconsistent decisions by the 
higher courts on the same points of law, potential litigants will be tempted to 
always try their luck at the courts, even if their claims involve settled points 
of law. 
In some ways, the lack of legal information, in relation to both judicial 
decisions and judicial performance, can be easily fixed. The ongoing 
computerisation programme of the judiciary already gathers the relevant 
information for their existing websites. On occasion we have been able to 
access significant and useful data on request from the backend servers and 
administrators of this data. We suggest that it should become the express 
mandate of the project to make all such legal information readily available 
to the public in a format capable of rigorous analysis. When one considers 
that taxpayers and litigants have funded this elaborate data gathering 
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exercise, it is a travesty that such data is locked away in impenetrable data 
formats and servers. Nowhere is this information more relevant than to 
address the urgent need to overcome the logjam in our criminal justice 
system, which we turn to in the next section.
A second significant legal information barrier that imposes rule of law 
costs is the lack of a comprehensive repository of the law (all statutes and 
regulations) that has been arranged in a way that makes it easy for ordinary 
citizens, lawyers and judges to work out what the legal rights and 
45obligations are in a given situation. As we have argued elsewhere,  what we 
need in this regard is a 3-step reorganisation of the statutory codes in India, 
consisting of collection, compilation and consolidation, whereby laws are 
re-arranged and consolidated by subject-matter, akin to the various Titles in 
the US Code. This process intrinsically overcomes desuetude and over-
regulation, and unlike a plain vanilla repeal exercise of the type proposed by 
the government, this type of consolidation will resolve inconsistent laws, 
clarify ambiguities in the law on a particular subject, and restate the law 
subject using a consistent drafting style and consistent word choices, 
leaving no 'gaps' in the law.  
IV. THE SHADOWY FIGURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
So far in this paper we have focused on approaches to civil justice 
reform and the legal system information gaps that make empirically 
grounded legal system reform proposals impossible. In this section we turn 
our attention to what is arguably the most critical area of reform: the 
criminal justice system. The Congress and BJP manifestos, while generally 
deficient on the subject of legal system reform, inadequately address reform 
of the criminal justice system. The BJP manifesto addresses the entire 
subject in a single line with the promise that they will "reform the criminal 
justice system to make the dispensation of justice simpler, quicker and more 
effective and after examining the recommendations of the earlier reports on 
46this subject."  This is still more than is seen in the Congress manifesto, 
which does not discuss the issue at all. This perfunctory treatment is all the 
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more surprising as the volume of criminal litigation dwarfs civil litigation 
especially in the lower courts and the gravest threat to the legitimacy of the 
Indian legal and political system is its persistent inability to put in place a 
47 legitimate means of maintaining social peace, law and order. Plainly 
stated, the only channel through which a majority of Indian citizens interact 
with the legal system is through the criminal law. As an illustrative example, 
at the starting of the quarter between July and September 2013, the total 
number of criminal cases pending before the High Courts and subordinate 
courts in the country was nearly 2 crores, while the number of civil cases 
was roughly 1.1 crores. At the end of the same quarter, the number of 
criminal cases pending was over 2 crores, while the number of civil cases 
48 was closer to 1.2 crores. The lower courts of the country, which form the 
first (and, in most cases, only) point of contact between members of the 
general public and the judiciary, are almost overwhelmingly stocked with 
criminal rather than civil cases. The position is slightly different in the 
higher judiciary, which deals predominantly with civil rather than criminal 
cases. 
There are three main components in the criminal justice machinery of 
49the Indian State: the police, the courts, and the prison system.  Each 
component needs discrete but coordinated reform to enhance peace and 
security while protecting the liberty of accused persons. The Indian police 
establishment is still governed by the archaic Indian Police Act of 1861. A 
50 lot of ink has been spilt reviewing this legislation, and proposing further 
changes to the structure of policing. The ineffectiveness of these earlier 
efforts to induce tangible changes in the structure and practice of policing 
led the Supreme Court to take the matter into its own hands in Prakash 
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Singh v. Union of India.  In this case the Supreme Court issued 
52comprehensive and concrete directions  to the State Governments to 
reform their police establishments by enhancing accountability and 
effectiveness by reducing political interference. Predictably, the response 
of the States to these directions has been lukewarm; these directions remain 
53unfulfilled in most States in the country.  Moreover, we have increasing 
evidence that egregious forms of misconduct such as torture and 
extrajudicial killing by the police and paramilitary forces have only 
54increased in the last decade.  While the structure and practice of policing 
deserves critical academic scrutiny, in this paper we focus our attention on 
another aspect of the Indian criminal justice system that is intransigent: 
unduly high levels of undertrial incarceration. 
Let us begin with a basic understanding of the prison population in 
India. The first important point to note is that rates of incarceration in India 
55 (an average of 31 persons per 100,000 population between 2001-2010) are 
exceptionally low by any international standard (the world rate was 144 
56 prisoners per 100,000 in 2013). The low incarceration rate in India is 
noteworthy but does not by itself suggest a faulty criminal justice system. 
What is a matter of concern, though, is that of these prisoners, 67 per cent 
51
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TRANSNATIONAL TORTURE: LAW, VIOLENCE AND STATE POWER IN 
were undertrials, which is similar to the undertrial detention rates in neigh 
bouring countries like Bangladesh (68 per cent in 2007) and Pakistan (66 
per cent) but vastly different from those of more developed countries such 
57as the United States (21 per cent) or England and Wales (16.5 per cent).  As 
the latter group of countries have developed well-functioning criminal 
justice systems, we posit that a high percentage of undertrial incarceration is 
an indicator of stress in our criminal justice system. 
Normatively, a threshold objection to high levels of undertrial 
incarceration is simply that the criminal justice system should not imprison 
people who have not been proven guilty by a court of law. Imprisonment 
involves a complete loss of liberty without the operation of the due process 
58  of the law, which no liberal democracy should accept. Secondly, it has 
long been a concern in penology that undertrial prisoners, who may very 
well be innocent, run the risk of 'contamination' when placed in close 
59contact with hardened criminals.  A third, but in no way less significant 
concern, is that individual undertrial prisoners lose valuable days and 
months of their lives and are forever stamped with the taint of being 
imprisoned, regardless of whether they are subsequently proved guilty. 
Since its inception, the Indian prison system has failed to separate convicted 
60 and undertrial prisoners. Hence, we conclude that such a high percentage 
of undertrial prisoners in the prison population is a pathological feature of 
the Indian criminal justice system. Moreover, it is critical that we ensure 
that the criminal justice system is restored to achieving its primary 
objective: to punish people guilty of crime. 
It may be argued that given India's low incarceration rate, we may 
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This is not to suggest that these countries do not possess sizeable criminal justice concerns 
restore a reasonable balance between undertrial and convict detention rates 
through a rapid and severe scaling up of the number of convicts in Indian 
prisons rather than a reduction in the undertrial population. While a 
comprehensive reform of the criminal justice system to ensure more 
convictions is urgent and necessary, the high absolute numbers of undertrial 
incarceration is nevertheless unacceptable for the normative reasons set out 
above. Moreover, reform that reduces undertrial incarceration may well 
reorient the criminal justice system to avoid using this as a substitute for 
incarceration after conviction. 
While there are several systemic reasons for the high levels of 
undertrial incarceration in India, our primary focus must be on the 
dysfunctional system of bail in the country. Bail is a form of security 
provided by an accused person in a criminal trial in order for them to secure 
a release from custody during the trial. It is also the most common way of 
keeping people out of prison when imprisonment is not strictly necessary. 
This security is forfeited if the accused person subsequently fails to appear 
in court. Every decade or so we witness an impassioned criticism of the 
iniquitous nature of criminal justice in India: Kapila Hingorani in the 1970s, 
61 62Upendra Baxi in the 1980s  and most recently Arvind Kejriwal  have 
argued that the system operates to exclude persons of limited means who, 
among other things, cannot afford to post bail, and therefore spend undue 
lengths of time in prison. A close look at data on persons in Indian prisons 
lends credence to this claim, as we demonstrate below.
Obtaining information regarding bail amounts and the financial means 
of accused persons is difficult as the Government does not release data on 
either question. Existing data provided by the National Crime Records 
Bureau, however, does give us other clues to better understand the prison 
population. Here we discuss two features of the undertrial population in 
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India that allow us to place in context claims about dysfunction in the bail 
system. The first of these relates to the educational qualifications of 
undertrial prisoners, while the second relates to the composition of offences 
for which they are arrested. We discuss these features using simple averages 
(means) taken across the ten year period from 2001 to 2010. 
In the absence of data on the financial capacity of undertrial prisoners, 
educational qualification gives us an alternate measure of their socio-
economic condition. The picture painted by the data is not encouraging. On 
average between 2001 and 2010, 37 per cent of undertrials in the country 
were illiterate; while close to 42 per cent had not completed class ten. 
Together these categories formed an overwhelming majority of the prison 
population- close to 70 per cent. Illiterate people especially are 
disproportionately represented in the undertrial population. In 2001 the 
63male literacy rate  was 75.3 per cent (Census 2001), while in 2011 this had 
gone up to close to 81 per cent (Census 2011). It is clear, then, that Indian 
prisoners, especially undertrials, generally possess little or no education 
and are from some of Indian society's most marginalized groups. These are 
people whose capacity to negotiate the legal process or access legal aid to 
vindicate their rights is severely compromised. The fact that our undertrial 
prisoners are drawn disproportionately from the most vulnerable parts of 
the Indian population is by itself a reason to rapidly reform the bail process. 
Another way of assessing the impact of the bail process is to examine 
the offences for which undertrial prisoners are in jail. Almost 10 per cent of 
the under trial population in India was accused of bailable offences during 
the years under study. Bailable offences such as cheating, or offenses under 
64 65the Arms  and Excise Acts,  or criminal defamation as in the Kejriwal case, 
are those for which bail is granted in the ordinary course unless the accused 
66is unable to pay the price of the bond.  To this we may add the fact that the 
second largest percentage of under trials in the country (9 per cent) were 
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average between 2001 and 2010, we compare the prison population to the male literacy rate 
here.
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 Given that males formed over 96 per cent of both the convict and under trial population on 
accused of 'theft', in many cases an instance of petty or non-serious crime.  
Given an average annual under trial population during the ten year period of 
around 2,36,000 individuals, this means that over 23,000 persons were 
incarcerated each year for bailable offences on average during the period. 
Though these undertrials constitute a minority of all undertrials in 
detention, this is a significant number of people in detention despite being 
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. 
thThe Law Commission of India in its 78  Report extensively examined 
the subject of bail and its relation to the ballooning undertrial population in 
the Country. It established that as a general rule, the severity of the offence 
68influences both the grant of bail as well as the size of the bond.  Persons 
accused of serious offences (punishable with life imprisonment or death) 
are in the ordinary course not to be granted bail. Despite these normatively 
unimpeachable conclusions, it is puzzling why close to 20 per cent of 
undertrials in India on average between 2001 and 2010 were incarcerated 
for either bailable or non-serious crimes. As a majority of those detained are 
either illiterate or have limited educational qualifications it is reasonable to 
ask whether these persons have received fair treatment from the criminal 
justice system. Thus, Arvind Kejriwal and others before him have rightly 
drawn attention to the socially unjust and inequitable character of the bail 
process and undertrial detention.
The last legislative attempt to reform the bail system was the 
introduction of Section 436A of the Criminal Procedure Code in 2005. This 
section mandates that undertrials who have served at least half of the 
maximum period of imprisonment under the offences they have been 
69accused of are entitled to release on a personal bond.  At the time, this 
provision was hailed as likely to result in a great reduction of the undertrial 
67
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th78  report, of recommending the amendment of the criminal law to make offences 
punishable with imprisonment for three years or less bailable, as a general rule. See LAW 
COMMISSION OF INDIA, SEVENTY EIGHTH REPORT ON CONGESTION OF UNDER-TRIAL 
PRISONERS IN JAILS 17 (1979). Currently there are a number of offences under the Indian 
Penal Code punishable with a maximum sentence of three years or less which are non-
bailable. 
68  LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, supra note 67.
69 As opposed to a bail bond which is a form of financial security, a personal bond is a written 
assurance by the accused that they will appear before the court during their trial. 
 In describing this offence as such we follow the Law Commission of India's approach in its 
population in the country.  However, the available data suggests that no 
such reduction happened. On the contrary, the undertrial population in fact 
increased, albeit marginally, from 2005 to 2010. The reason for this failure 
to make a significant dent in the country's undertrial population is best 
understood to be related to the relatively short average period of detention 
of most under-trials. Krishnan and Kumar, using prison data from 2007 and 
2010, establish that length of detention is not as much of a problem as earlier 
imagined; most undertrials in Indian prisons spend less than 6 months in 
71prison.  Examining data from a longer time period confirms this result. 
Between 2001 and 2010, on average more than 60 per cent of undertrials 
were incarcerated for periods of less than 6 months each year. Further, close 
72to 80 per cent of undertrials were incarcerated for less than one year.  The 
often-heard refrain that undertrials in India spend years and years in prison, 
often longer than the time they would have spent if convicted, appears to be 
true in a relatively small number of cases. So while Section 436A 
introduced a valuable safeguard against excessively long undertrial 
detention it did not reduce numbers of undertrial prisoners significantly, as 
the law makers misdiagnosed the character of undertrial detention in India. 
The failure of this legislative reform should not lead us to the 
conclusion that it is not possible to restore a healthy balance between 
convicts and undertrials in Indian prisons. Instead, we must embrace the 
possibility and potential of new institutional mechanisms and non-
legislative modes of intervention. The creation of 'bail funds' at central, 
state and local levels is a promising institutional option. Bail funds are a 
relatively recent innovation across the world and provide a state supported, 
civil society managed mechanism to release undertrials of inadequate 
means or those whose social bonds do not allow them to post bail. These 
funds are used to pay the bail amount and secure the release of persons 
accused of minor offences. Bail funds have met with considerable success 
70
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EXPRESS (Jun. 21, 2006), available at http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/friday-
thousands-of-undertrials-will-get-right-to-walk-free--------/7018/.
71 Krishnan et al., Delay in Process, Denial of Justice: The Jurisprudence and Empirics of 
Speedy Trial in Comparative Perspective, 42 GEO. J. INT'L. L. 764, 764 (2010).
72 Limitations with the data however prevent us from unearthing the entire story; there might 
be significant numbers of undertrials accused of minor offences who indeed spend more than 
half of their potential sentences imprisoned without being convicted. In absolute terms 
however, the majority of undertrials in India do not appear to remain in prison for as long as is 
often argued. 
E.g., Ritu Sarin, Friday: Thousands of Undertrials will get right to walk free, THE INDIAN 
in New York in both enabling the release of persons pending trial, as well as 
73securing the attendance of such persons during hearings.  Given that the 
offence composition in Indian prisons reveals that up to 20% of undertrials 
are incarcerated for petty or non-serious offences, bail funds have the 
potential to significantly reduce the undertrial population in the country. 
Additionally, as opposed to legislative or judicial reform, which may take 
decades, bail funds offer the potential for almost immediately measurable 
74results.  Some non-governmental organisations in India have already 
75initiated steps to create funds of this type.  In the context of the grotesque 
imbalance in the pattern of incarceration in India, options such as these 
require wider exploration and potential adoption. Reforming the bail 
system will reinforce the fundamental purpose of the criminal justice 
system: the punishment of the guilty, and reorient policing and prosecution 
towards securing convictions rather than victimizing the accused through 
the criminal trial process.
As serious as it is, undertrial incarceration is only one aspect of the 
Indian criminal justice administration in need of reform. Problems of police 
76 77 78accountability,  lengths of trial  and conditions in prison  among others, 
are all distinct and equally serious. As we have argued in the rest of this 
piece, the best way to approach these problems is through sustained, 
empirically driven research and interventions. The criminal justice system 
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York City, 93% of these defendants returned for every court date. See Julie Turkewitz, 
Helping Poor Defendants Post Bail in Backlogged Bronx, THE NEW YORK TIMES  (Jan. 22, 
2014), available at http://nyti.ms/19P0IYV.
74 There are however other important considerations to keep in mind when thinking of 
introducing bail funds; these funds depend on a significant level of engagement between the 
fund and the accused person once they are released in order to ensure that the latter regularly 
attends hearings. For an analysis of the working of the Bronx Defenders Freedom Fund, see 
Andrea Clisura, None of Their Business: The Need for Another Alternative to New York's 
Bail Bond Business, 19 J. L. & POL'Y. 307 (2010).
75 Stanley Pinto, Amnesty India mulls Bail fund to rescue undertrials, THE TIMES OF INDIA, 
(Jan. 8, 2014), available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Amnesty-India-mulls-
bail-fund-to-rescue-undertrials/articleshow/28528191.cms.
76 National Crime Records Bureau, supra note 55; The Prisons Act, supra note 59.
77 Id.
78 E.g., COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, CONDITIONS OF DETENTION IN THE 
PRISONS OF KARNATAKA (2010),  available at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/ 
publications/prisons/conditions_of_detention_in_the_prisons_of_karnataka.pdf; PEOPLE'S 
UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, BEYOND THE PRISON GATES: A REPORT ON LIVING 
CONDITIONS IN TIHAR JAIL (2011), available at http://www.pudr.org/sites/default/files/ 
Tihar%20final%20report.pdf.
Between 2007 and 2009, the Bronx Freedom Fund supplied bail for 150 defendants in New 
is better off than the rest of the legal system in terms of data on its 
functioning. The National Crime Records Bureau does a commendable job 
in publishing national statistics both on crime as well as prisons on an 
79annual basis.  There are some major problems with these data sources; 
cases of crimes against women, in particular, are suspected to be seriously 
80 under-reported in official crime statistics. However, these data sources 
offer us the only credible base on which to evaluate and build strategies for 
reform. It is high time Indian policy makers took both the problems as well 
as the data as seriously as they deserve.
V. CONCLUSION
The renewed seriousness with which both major political parties 
approached the subject of legal and judicial system reform before the 2014 
general election is a welcome development. In this article we have 
highlighted some of the persistent barriers to serious legal and judicial 
system reform in India: ad hoc piece-meal reform without adequate 
empirical understanding or a nuanced normative analysis of the challenges 
to such reform. We have proposed that a systemic, empirically grounded 
and normatively rigorous approach can yield significant and innovative 
reform. In this article we have sought to demonstrate what such reform 
would look like in three fields: civil justice system, legal system 
information and the criminal justice system. Legal system reform that stays 
close to the best empirical evidence available, and committed to creating 
state capacity that is at once accountable and limited, is our best chance to 
go beyond the current stasis in this field.
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are illustrative examples of these. 
80 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CRIME STATISTICS (2011), available at 
http://mospi.nic.in/mospi_new/upload/Report_crime_stats_29june11.pdf.
E.g., Crime in India 2013 and Prisons Statistics India 2013, available at http://ncrb.gov.in/ 
